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Abstract 
IEEE 802.11 Wireless Networks have gained popularity, providing users mobility and 
flexibility in accessing information. Existing solutions for wireless LAN networks have been 
exposed to security vulnerabilities. Previous study has evaluated the security performance of 
IEEE 802.11 wireless networks using single server-client architecture. This research 
investigated the effect of multiple security mechanisms on the performance of multi-client 
congested and un-congested networks. The effect of different TCP and UDP packet sizes on 
performance of secure networks was also studied. The results showed that WEP encryption 
significantly degrades the performance of congested wireless networks. Network performance 
degradation increased as the number of clients was increased under all security mechanisms. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The market for wireless communications has experienced incredible growth over recent years. 
Wireless Local Area Networks (Wireless LANs) have quickly found a significant place and 
popularity in business and the computer industry alike [17]. The major benefit of wireless 
LANs is increased flexibility and mobility [12]. Unlike a traditional wired LAN, which 
requires a wire to connect a computer to the network, users can access wireless LANs from 
nearly anywhere without any restriction; that has greatly increased wireless LANs' popularity. 
This significant reliance on wireless networks makes it tremendously important to maintain 
reliable and secure links between the communicating parties. 
Security risks in wireless networks are equal to the sum of the risk of operating a wired 
network plus the new risks introduced due to the portability of wireless devices [3]. To reduce 
these risks, organizations need to adopt security measures and practices that help bring down 
their risks to a manageable level. 
This research will investigate the performance and security issues of an IEEE 802.11 wireless 
LAN with the layered security model, using multiple clients. It will study the interaction 
between different security layers and their effects on performance (response time and 
throughput) of congested and on-congested networks. The research will also evaluate the 
effect of different TCP and UDP packet sizes on network performance, under different 
security mechanisms. 
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to existing wireless networks and detailed analysis of 
IEEE 802.11 protocols and standards is presented. It explains the two security architectures: 
WEP (an IEEE 802.11 security standard) and IEEE 802.1x authentication protocol (an 
enhancement for default WEP authentication). It also discusses the prior research carried out 
to evaluate the performance of wireless networks. Chapter 3 presents the goal of this research, 
the design considerations and the different security mechanisms used during the experiments. 
The model and system architecture is described and the experimented results are presented 
and analysed. Direction for future work is presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 draws some 
conclusion on the research presented in this report. 
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Chapter 2 
Background 
2.1 Wireless Networks 
Over recent years, the market for wireless communications has experienced incredible growth. 
Wireless technologies have quickly found a significant place and popularity in business and 
the computer industry. Their major motivation and benefit is increased flexibility and 
mobility. Unlike a traditional wired network, which requires a wire to connect a computer to 
the network, wireless technology enables the users to access information from anywhere 
without any restriction. Wireless networks are frequently categorised into three groups based 
on their coverage range [3]: Wireless Wide Area Network (WW AN), Wireless Local Area 
Network (WLAN), and Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN). 
Wireless WANs include wide coverage area technologies such as Advanced Mobile Phone 
Systems (AMPS), Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), and the Code Division Multiple 
Access (CDMA). Existing second-generation (2G) digital cellular systems are Global System 
for Mobile (GSM) in Europe, and Personal Digital Communication (PDC) in Japan. The 2G 
to 2.5G wireless WANs provides data rate from 9.6 Kbps to 348 Kbps. As for third-
generation (3G) systems, Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) is one of the 
major systems aiming for higher capacity and data rates with global mobility, and operates 
around 144 Kbps to 2 Mbps [8]. 
Wireless LANs provide greater flexibility and portability than do traditional wired LANs. 
Unlike a wired LAN, which requires a wire to access the network, a Wireless LAN connects 
computers and other components to the network via an Access Point (AP). IEEE 802.11 is an 
international standard providing transmission speeds ranging from 1 Mbps to 54 Mbps in 
either the 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz frequency bands. Section 2.2 discusses the 802.11 standard in 
more detail. High performance radio LAN1 is another wireless LAN standard operating in the 
5 GHz frequency band. HiperLAN/1 has a transmission speed of 19 Mbps, while HiperLAN/2 
operates at 54 Mbps. HiperLAN/2 supports Quality of Service (QoS) and is based on an 
infrastructure topology. 
Wireless PANs typically provide a maximum range of 10 meters, facilitating communication 
between laptops, cell phones and Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs). The best-known 
Wireless PAN technology, Bluetooth 2 , is based on low power signaling in the 2.4 GHz 
frequencies similar to the 802.11 b standard, but using a different approach to signal 
processing. It is intended to provide wireless links between mobile computers, PDA' s, cell 
phones and the Internet. Significant operational differences between Bluetooth and 802.11 b 
are the bandwidth, 1 Mbps versus 11 Mbps, and distance, 10M versus 100M. IEEE 802.15 is 
another Wireless PAN technology that aims at very low power consumption, and operates at 
10 meters with data rates less than 1 Mbps. The 802.15 WPAN standard targets 
interoperability between Wireless PAN devices and devices meeting the IEEE 802.11 
standard [8]. 
1 http://www.hiperlan2.com 
2 http://www.bluetooth.com 
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Figure 2-1 (adapted from [ 13]) illustrates the three main categories of wireless networks and 
their coverage ranges. The most successful wireless networking technology this far has been 
802.11 [4] and hence is the main focus of this research. 
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Figure 2-1: Overview of Wireless Networks 
2.1.1 Benefits and Limitations 
Wireless LANs offer several fundamental benefits including user mobility, rapid installation, 
flexibility and scalability. However, there are some primary limitations [4]: 
o The speed of wireless networks is constrained by the available bandwidth. 
Information Theory can be used to deduce the upper limit on the speed of a network. 
Wireless network hardware tends to be slower than wired hardware. Unlike the 
Ethernet standard, wireless standards must carefully validate received frames to guard 
against loss due to the unreliability of the wireless medium. 
o Using radio waves as the network medium poses several challenges. Specifications 
for wired networks are designed so that a network will work as long as it meets the 
specifications. Radio waves can suffer from a number of propagation problems that 
may interrupt the radio link, such as multi-path interference and shadows. 
o Security on any network is a prime concern. On wireless networks, it is often a 
critical concern because the network transmissions are available to anyone within 
range of the transmitter with the appropriate antenna. On a wired network, the signals 
stay in the wires and can be protected by strong physical-access control. On a 
wireless network, sniffing is much easier because the radio transmissions are 
designed to be processed by any receiver within range. 
2.2 IEEE 802.11 Wireless Standards 
2.2.1 History of 802.11 
The IEEE breaks their standards into various committees. The IEEE 802 Committee deals 
with Local and Metropolitan Area Networks. The 802 series of standards is broken into 
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working groups that focus on specific issues within the overall discipline of LANs and MANs 
[9]. 
The following is a list of some of the 802 working groups: 
o 802.1: Bridging and Management 
o 802.2: Logical Link Control 
o 802.3: CSMA/CD Access Method 
o 802.4: Token-Passing Bus Access Method 
0 802.7: Broadband LAN 
o 802.11: Wireless 
The 802.11 Working Group was formed in September of 1990. Their goal was to create a 
wireless LAN specification that will operate in one of the Industrial, Scientific, and Medical 
(ISM) frequency ranges, The first 802.11 standard was released in 1997 [17]. 
The 802 standards address the lower levels of the OSI model. The 802.11 protocols address 
the Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical (PHY) layers independently. The MAC 
layer handles moving data between the link layer and the physical medium. Figure 2-2 
illustrates how the lower layers of the OSI model match up to the concepts outlined in the 802 
seiies of protocols. 
There are many different PHY standards in use nowadays. The oiiginal 802.11 specification 
documented three different mechanisms: Infrared (IR), 2.4 GHz Frequency Hopping Spread 
Spectrum (FHSS), and 2.4 GHz Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS). All these 
mechanisms provided 1 or 2 Mbps data rate depending on the signal quality. 
OSI 
data-link 
layer 
OSI 
Physical 
layer 802.11 1 
802.11 LCC 
802.11 MAC 
802.11 b 1 802.11a I 802.11g 
Figure 2-2: The OS! layers and corresponding 802 structure 
The specific groups and tasks concerning wireless networking hardware standards are as 
follows: 
0 802.11b 
802.llb [19, 22], released on 1999, specified a new PHY that provided a higher bit 
rate using DSSS in the 2.4 GHz range. 802.llb can transmit data up to 11 Mbps but 
will scale down to 1 Mbps based on conditions. Due to the higher bit rate and 
increased interpretability, 802.11 b has gained rapid deployment. Interoperability 
between different 802.11 products is tested and certified by Wireless Ethernet 
Compatibility Alliance (WECA3) and their certification mark is Wi-Fi4• 
3 The WECA includes Cisco, 3Com, Enterasys, Lucent, and many other wireless networking 
companies. For more information, refer to http://www.weca.net/. 
4 Wireless Fidelity 
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o 802.11a 
802.11a [18], released in 2001, operates in the 5 GHz range. It provides a bit rate of 
up to 54 Mbps and uses a modulation method called Orthogonal Frequency Division 
Multiplexing (OFDM). Some vendors have proprietary implementations that double 
the bit rate of 802.11a to 102 Mbps. 
0 802.11g 
802.11g [20] operates in the same 2.4 GHz range as 802.11b but uses OFDM similar 
to 802.11a. Operating at up to 22 Mbps, it is seen as the middleman between 802.11 b 
and 802.1la standards. 
Table 2-1 summarises the 802.11 PHY specifications. 802.11 b is currently the most deployed 
type of wireless LAN and is used in the experimentation part of this research. 
802.llb DSSS 
802.1 2.4GHZ OFDM 
802.lla 50HZ OFDM 
Table 2-1: PHY specifications 
2.2.2 Protocol Layers 
The physical layer defines the frequency band, data rate, and other details of the actual radio 
transmission. Above the physical layer is the MAC layer that regulates access to the shared 
radio frequency band so that station transmissions do not interfere with one another. The 
MAC layer has two sub-layers: the lower one is the distributed coordination fimction (DCF), 
which uses an Ethernet-style contention algorithm that provides access to all traffic. Ordinary 
asynchronous traffic uses this coordination function (see Section 2.2.4). The upper MAC sub-
layer is the point coordination function ( PCF), a centralised MAC algorithm that provides 
contention-free service by polling stations in turn. Higher priority traffic-traffic with greater 
timing requirements-uses this coordination function (see Section 2.2.4). Finally, the logical 
link control layer provides an inteliace to higher layers and performs basic link layer 
functions such as error control (Figure 2-3, adapted from [ 17, 56]). 
2.2.3 Types of networks 
The 802.11 standard defines two modes: infrastructure mode and ad hoc mode. In 
infrastructure mode (Figure 2-4), the wireless network consists of at least one AP connected 
to the wired network infrastructure and a set of wireless end stations. This configuration is 
called a Basic Service Set (BSS). If one mobile station in an infrastructure BSS needs to 
communicate with a second mobile station, the communication must take two hops. First the 
originating mobile station transfers the frame to the AP. Second, the AP transfers the frame to 
the destination station. With all communications relayed through an AP, the basic service area 
corresponding to an Infrastructure BSS is defined by the points in which transmissions from 
the AP can be received. 
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Figure 2-3: The 802.11 Protocol Stack 
Although the multi-hop transmission takes more transmission capacity than a directed frame 
from the sender to the receiver, it has two major advantages [9]: 
D An infrastructure BSS is defined by the distance from the AP. All mobile stations are 
required to be within reach of the AP, but no restriction is placed on the distance 
between mobile stations themselves. Allowing direct communication between mobile 
stations would save transmission capacity but at the cost of increased physical layer 
complexity, since mobile stations would need to maintain neighbour relationships 
with all other mobile stations within the service area. 
D APs in infrastructure networks are in a position to assist with stations attempting to 
save power. APs can note when a stations enters a power-saving model (see Section 
2.2.4) and buffer frames for it. Battery-operated stations can turn the wireless 
transceiver off and power it up only to transmit and retrieve buffered frames from the 
AP. 
An Extended Service Set (ESS) is a set of two or more BSSs forming a single sub-network. 
Since most corporate Wireless LANs require access to the wired LAN for services (file 
servers, printers, futernet links), they will operate in infrastructure mode. This research uses 
the infrastructure mode for the experiments. 
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Figure 2-4: Infrastructure mode 
Ad hoc mode (also called peer-to-peer mode or an Independent Basic Service Set, or IDSS) is 
a set of 802.11 wireless stations that communicate directly with one another without using an 
AP or any connection to a wired network (Figure 2-5). One common use is to create a short-
lived network to support a single meeting in a conference room. As the meeting begins, the 
participants create an IDSS to share data. When the meeting ends, the IDSS is dissolved. Due 
to their short duration, small size and'focused purpose, msss are usually referred to as ad hoc 
networks. 
Figure 2-5: Ad hoc mode 
2.2.4 MAC Layer 
Medium Access Control (MAC) is supported by all physical layers. It provides the core 
framing operations and the interaction with a wired network backbone. Different physical 
layers may provide different transmission speeds, all of which are supposed to intemperate. 
802.11 does not depart from the previous IEEE 802 standards in any major way. The standard 
successfully adapts Ethernet-style networking to radio links. Similar to Ethernet, 802.11 uses 
a Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) scheme to control access to the transmission 
medium. However, collisions waste valuable transmission capacity, so rather than the 
Collision Detection (CSMA/CD) employed by Ethernet, 802.11 uses Collision A voidance 
(CSMA/CA) [6]. Similar to Ethernet, 802.11 uses a distributed access scheme with no 
centralised controller. Each 802.11 station uses the same method to gain access to the medium. 
The major differences between 802.11 and Ethernet come from the differences in the 
underlying medium. 
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The following summarises primary 802.11 MAC functions, especially as they relate to 
infrastructure wireless LANs [6, 17, 59}: 
o Scanning: The 802.11 standard defines both passive and active scanning; whereby, a 
radio NIC5 searches for APs. Passive scanning is mandatory where each NIC scans 
individual channels to find the best AP signal. Periodically, APs broadcast a beacon, 
and the radio NIC receives these beacons while scanning and takes note of the 
corresponding signal strengths. The beacons 6 contain information about the AP, 
including SSID7 and supported data rates. The radio NIC can usc this information 
along with the signal strength to compare APs and decide upon which one to usc. 
Optional active scanning is similar, except the radio NIC initiates the process by 
broadcasting a probe frame and all APs within range respond with a probe response. 
Active scanning enables a radio NIC to receive immediate response from APs, 
without waiting for a beacon transmission; however, this will create additional 
overhead on the network. 
o Authentication: Authentication is the process of proving identity. The 802.11 
standard specifies two forms: Open system authentication and shared key 
authentication. Open system authentication is mandatory, and it is a two-step process. 
A radio NIC first initiates the process by sending an authentication request frame to 
the AP. The AP replies with an authentication response frame containing approval or 
disapproval of authentication indicated in the Status Code field in the frame body. 
Shared key authentication is an optional four-step process that bases authentication on 
whether the authenticating device has the correct WEP (wired equivalent privacy) 
key8• The radio NIC starts by sending an authentication request frame to the AP. The 
AP then places challenge text into the frame body of a response frame and sends it to 
the radioNIC. The radioNIC uses its WEP key to encrypt the challenge text and then 
sends it back to the AP in another authentication frame. The AP decrypts the 
challenge text and compares it to the initial text. If they are the same, the AP assumes 
that the radioNIC has the conect key. The AP finishes the sequence by sending an 
authentication frame to the radio NIC with the approval or disapproval. 
o Association: Once authenticated, the radio NIC must associate with the AP before 
sending data frames. Association is necessary to synchronise the radio NIC and AP 
with important information, such as supported data rates. The radio NIC initiates the 
association by sending an association request frame containing elements such as 
SSID and supported data rates. The AP responds by sending an association response 
frame containing an association ID along with other information regarding the AP. 
Once the radio NIC and AP complete the association process, they can send data 
frames to each other. 
o Privacy: With a wireless LAN, eavesdropping is a major concern because of the ease 
of capturing a transmission [17}. To assure privacy, IEEE 802.11 provides for the 
optional usc of encryption by specifying a scheme based on the Wired Equivalent 
Privacy (WEP) algorithm (see Section 2.4). With the optional WEP enabled, the 
wireless NIC will encrypt the body and not the header of each frame before 
transmission using a common key, and the receiving station will decrypt the frame 
5 Network Interface Card. 
6 For more information about beacon frame, refer to [25]. 
7 Service Set Identifier 
8 For more information, see Section 2.4. 
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upon receipt using the common key. The 802.11 standard specifies a 40-bit key and 
no key distribution method, which makes 802.11 wireless LANs vulnerable to 
eavesdroppers. For stronger protections, some 802.11 vendors offer optional 128-bit 
encryption. The 802.1li committee, however, has improved 802.11 security by 
incorporating 802.1x and stronger encryption into the standard (see Section 2.5). 
o RTS/CTS: The optional Request-To-Send and Clear-To-Send (RTS/CTS) function 
allows the AP to control use of the medium for stations activating RTS/CTS. With 
most radio NICs, users can set a maximum frame length threshold whereby the radio 
NIC will activate RTS/CTS. For instance, a frame length of 1,000 bytes will trigger 
RTS/CTS for all frames larger than 1,000 bytes. The use of RTS/CTS alleviates 
hidden node problems, that is, where two or more radio NICs cannot hear each other 
and they are associated with the same AP. 
If the radio NIC activates RTS/CTS, it will first send a RTS frame to AP before 
sending a data frame. The AP will then respond with a CTS frame, indicating that the 
radio NIC can send the data frame. With the CTS frame, the AP will provide a value 
in the duration field of the frame header that holds off other stations from transmitting 
until after the radio NIC initiating the RTS can send its data frame. This avoids 
collisions between hidden nodes. The RTS/CTS handshake continues for each frame, 
as long as the frame size exceeds the threshold set in the cmTesponding radio NIC. 
o Power Save Mode: The optional power save mode that a user can turn on or off 
enables the radio NIC to con.serve battery power when there is no need to send data. 
With power save mode on, the radioNIC indicates its desire to enter sleep state to the 
AP via a status bit located in the header of each frame. The AP takes note of each 
radio NIC wishing to enter power save mode, and buffers packets corresponding to 
the sleeping station. In order to still receive data frames, the sleeping NIC must wake 
up periodically (at the right time) to receive regular beacon transmissions coming 
from the AP. 
o Fragmentation: The optional fragmentation function enables an 802.11 station to 
divide data packets into smaller frames. This is done to avoid needing to retransmit 
large frames in the presence of RF interference (see Section 2.3.1). The bits eJTors 
resulting from RF interference are likely to affect a single frame, and it requires less 
overhead to retransmit a smaller frame rather than a larger one. As with RTS/CTS, 
users can generally set a maximum frame length threshold whereby the radio NIC 
will activate fragmentation. If the frame size is larger than the threshold, the radio 
NIC will break the packet into multiple frames, with each frame no larger than the 
threshold value. 
Access to the wireless medium is controlled by coordination functions. Ethemet-like 
CSMA/CA access is provided by the distributed coordination function (DCF). If contention-
free service is required, it can be provided by the point coordination ftmction ( PCF) that is 
built on top of the DCF. Contention-free services are provided only in infrastructure networks. 
The coordination functions are described below9 and illustrated in Figure 2-3. 
o DCF: The DCF is the basis of the standard CSMA/CA access mechanism. Similar to 
Ethernet, it first checks to see whether the radio link is clear before transmitting. To 
avoid collisions, stations use a random backoff after each frame, with the first 
transmitter seizing the channel. In some circumstances, the DCF may use the 
9 For more information, refer to [6, 23]. 
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CTS/RTS clearing technique (mentioned above) to further reduce the possibility of 
collisions. 
o PCF: Point coordination provides contention-free services. Special stations called 
point coordinators are used to ensure that the medium is provided without contention. 
Point coordinators reside in APs, so the PCF is restricted to infrastructure networks. 
To gain priority over standard contention-based services, the PCF allows a station to 
transmit frames after a shorter interval. The PCF is not implemented in the market yet 
[6]. 
2.3 Bandwidth of 802.11 Wireless LANs 
The 802.11 b standard is generally understood as an 11 Mbps Ethernet LAN running in the 2.4 
GI-Iz ISM radio band. Because of the demands of the protocol, and the multiple factors 
influencing radio signals, it is very unlikely that the users will ever achieve 11 Mbps as an 
operational bandwidth on their LANs. The theoretical throughput can be attained by using 
DCF (see Section 2.2.4) as 75% of the nominal bit rate [2], although a target of 65% is 
commonly observed. Applying this formula to an 11 Mbps 802.11 b network, this yields a 
practical throughput in the range of 6 to 8 Mbps. A comparison test was carried out on the 
802.11a and 802.llb throughput limits [31]; the author observed the limit for 802.11a was 
30.34 Mbps and 6.44 Mbps for 802.11 b. The maximum overall throughput of an 802.11 b 
Wireless LAN in a similar study [ 40] was reported to be about 6.45 Mbps with a standard 
deviation of 0.02 Mbps for a single station. Another study [57] analysed IEEE 802.11 
operation under various assumptions such as time-independent modeling, geometrically 
distributed packet sizes, etc. Those results also showed that the IEEE 802.11 standard 
operates at rates lower than a theoretically possible 7.27 Mbps. 
The actual amount of bandwidth is largely dependent on interference and frequency 
congestion, as discussed in the next following sections: 
2.3.1 Interference 
Reduced to its simplest form, wireless networking is a network where the physical wires have 
been replaced by radio signals. Unlike wires, radio signals are susceptible to a wide variety of 
physical and radio frequency (RF) interference. This interference will normally manifest itself 
as a reduction in performance, and occasionally will result in a complete shutdown. 
We assume a signal that reaches from point "A", the wireless AP, to point "B", the wireless 
network interface card in a workstation. The signal might be affected by the following factors 
[22, 30]: 
o Distance (a physical factor): The closer the wireless device is to the wireless AP, 
the stronger the signal, and the better the performance. A stronger signal requires 
fewer retransmissions. This is usually only a problem at the edges of the range, but is 
a selious consideration for the designer. 
D Physical barriers such as walls and widows: These are obvious sources of 
interference, but another significant source of interference can result from the 
placement of furniture and other objects in the space between points "A" and "B" as 
well as the walls that define the space. This kind of inte1ference is called multi-path 
propagation. Assuming a line of sight path between points "A" and "B", a portion of 
the signal will go directly between the two antennae. Another pmtion of the signal 
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will bounce off adjacent walls and furniture, and will anive at the receiving antenna 
some time after the original signal. If the delay is sufficient, the receiving station will 
not be able to decode the signal and will not acknowledge the packet, requiring a 
retransmission by the sender. This type of interference is most prevalent in a large 
space with many reflective surfaces such as a warehouse or manufacturing plant, 
however, is certainly not limited to those types of spaces. 
o Radio frequency (RF) interference: RF interference involves the presence of 
unwanted, interfering RF signals that disrupt normal system operations. The 802.11 b 
sets the standard for wireless networking in the 2.4 GHz radio spectrum. This 
spectrum is known as the ISM (Industrial, Scientific and Medical). It means that there 
are also other devices that can radiate radio signals on the same frequency as 802.11 b 
networking devices. These will include 2.4 GHz wireless telephones, commercial 
microwave ovens and Bluetooth devices [30]. Additionally, other 802.11b networks 
in close proximity can intelfere with a network. As mentioned before in Section 2.2.4, 
802.11 devices use CSMA/CA technique when transmitting packets. This means that 
they will only transmit when no other device is transmitting. If a device sees another 
signal, it will wait for that signal to end before attempting to transmit its packet. If 
there is another signal of sufficient strength on the 2.4 GHz band, an 802.11 device 
may see it as another 802.11 device and delay transmission. In addition, since these 
other radiation sources are not necessarily participating in the protocol, they can start 
at any time and interfere with a packet being transmitted. This will result in a 
conupted packet, a subsequent retransmission and hence a poor performance. If the 
source of the interference is· strong enough and continuous, it can completely shut 
down the network. 
Geier [30] suggests some actions to be taken in order to avoid RF interference. These will 
include analysing the potential for RF interference, preventing them from operating, 
providing adequate wireless LAN coverage and setting configuration parameters (such as 
frequency channel) properly. 
2.3.2 Frequency congestion 
802.11 b devices share the 2.4 GHz frequency spectrum with a bewildering number of other 
radiation sources. The spectrum was originally designated as experimental and its primary 
usage was granted to amateur radio. ISM and RF devices were allowed to use the band under 
specific rules governing power output and non-intelference. RF devices such as 802.11 b, 
which operate at low power levels, must accept interference from other sources, and may not 
interfere with the primary user. As the number of 802.11 b implementations increases, so will 
the opportunities for interference with other users. 
There has already been some studies aiming at developing signaling strategies to minimise 
interference between 802.11b and other RF devices in the band [22], but there are some 
theoretical limits. The cunent 802.11 b standard allows three channels to operate 
simultaneously within the spectrum. In a multi-tenant building, this may be inadequate for the 
demand. 
In addition to the existing RF devices that can cause interference, RF Lighting is a new 
technology that could have a serious impact on frequency congestion. In RF Lighting, a bulb 
containing a mixture of argon and sulphur is exposed to a high frequency RF signal causing it 
to fluoresce brightly. This technology promises low energy, high output, and long life. It also 
operates in the 2.4 GHz band, and may promise additional challenges for 802.11b users10• 
10 For more information, see http://wifinetnews.com/archives/001258.html. 
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A solution to frequency congestion occurrence in the 802.11 b band is to migrate to the 
802.lla band [22]. This will solve the congestion problem, but at a significant cost since it 
will require replacement of both APs and wireless network interface cards, and may force 
some re-design because of smaller distance limitations. 
Since 802.11 wireless networks use a shared medium, the more devices that are trying to 
access it, the lower the effective throughput will be. This is similar to standard wired Ethemet. 
When an 802.11 device is transmitting, no other device in the network may transmit data. If 
there are multiple devices trying to send large amounts of data, there will be heavy contention 
for the airwaves. This congestion gets worse as more machines are added or more data is 
being transmitted [16]. 
2.4 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
2.4.1 WEP Protocol 
Interception of radio communications has been a problem for as long as radios have been used 
to transmit sensitive information. Since radio transmissions travel in unsecured areas, 
interception of theses radio signals by an attacker is a real threat. In order to protect the data 
from eavesdroppers, various forms of encryption have been used. 
The 802.11 MAC specification describes an encryption protocol called Wired Equivalent 
Privacy (WEP). The goal of WEP is to make Wireless LAN communication as secure as 
wired LAN data transmissions. WEP provides two critical pieces to the wireless security 
architecture: authentication and confidentiality. It uses a shared key mechanism with a 
symmetric cipher called RC4 11 • The key that a client is using for authentication and 
encryption of the data stream must be the same key that the AP uses. The 802.11 standard 
specifies a 40-bit key, however most vendors have also implemented a 104-bit key for greater 
securit/2 13 • 
Encryption of the data stream provides confidentiality of the data transmitted between two 
Wireless LAN devices. The encryption mechanism used in WEP is a symmetric cipher; this 
means that the key, which is used to encrypt the data, is the same key that will decrypt the 
data. If both wireless LAN devices do not have the same encryption key, the data transfer 
fails 14• 
As described in Section 2.2.4, when a station wants to associate with an AP, the station must 
authenticate itself to the AP first. When the association occurs, the station and AP exchange 
the type of authentication they will accept. If the authentication type is specified as open, 
there will effectively be no authentication. The AP and station identify themselves to each 
other and the association is complete. The devices may also select the shared secret 
authentication mechanism. Station A will send a random number to station B. Station B 
encrypts the random umber using WEP and sends the result back to station A. Station A 
decrypts the received packet and verifies the decrypted payload equals to random number it 
sent to station B. If the numbers match, station A notifies station B that the authentication was 
successful and the association is formed (see Figure 2-6, adapted from [5]). 
11 Rivest Cipher 4 
12 Microsoft Implementation of Windows XP supports 40-bit and 104-bit keys. Both have been 
used in the experimental part of this research (see Chapter 3 for more details). 
13 It is worthy to note that keys are often based on passwords that are chosen by users; this typically 
reduces the effective key size. 
14 For more information about WEP encryption, refer to [3, 24]. 
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2.4.2 Problems with WEP 
There are some known vulnerabilities in the standardised security of the 802.11 b Wireless 
LAN standard. As mentioned above, the WEP protocol is used in 802.11-based Wireless 
LANs. Several groups of computer security specialists have discovered security problems that 
let malicious users compromise the security of Wireless LANs. These include passive attacks 
to decrypt traffic based on statistical analysis, active attacks to inject new traffic from 
unauthorised mobile stations (i.e., based on known plaintext), active attacks to decrypt traffic 
(i.e., based on tricking the AP), and dictionary-building attacks [3]. The dictionary building 
attack is possible after analysing a full day's traffic. Because significant attention is now on 
the security of 802.11, more attacks are likely to be discovered. Some of the problems 
associated with WEP and 802.llb Wireless LAN security are summarised in Table 2-2 
(adapted from [3]). 
Fluhrer et al. [15] presented a paper in which the team described a weakness in RC4 as it is 
implemented in WEP protocol. The issue is not with RC4, but with the way it is used by 
WEP. The end result is that WEP can be cracked if enough traffic can be intercepted. In 
addition, as the key length grows, the time it takes grows linearly, while it is supposed to 
grow exponentially. There are several freely available tools to crack WEP keys, including 
AirSnort15 and WEPCrack16. For more information on WEP flaws, refer to [15, 26, 27]. 
2.4.3 WEP Improvement 
The link layer security provisions in the 802.11 standards are all vulnerable to attacks. 
Therefore, systems should deploy additional higher-level security mechanisms such as access 
control, end-to-end encryption, password protection, authentication, virtual private networks, 
or firewalls [5] and assume WEP as a very basic layer of security only. The IEEE 802.11 
committee has set up task group 802.lli [29] to enhance the security and authentication 
mechanism of the current 802.11 MAC. Their work has resulted in the development of: 
o replacement of the 802.11 standard with 802.lx [1, 32] authentication and key 
management. 
15 http://airsnort.shmoo.com 
16 http://wepcrack.sourceforge.net/ 
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o improvement of the exiting WEP with Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP), also 
known as WEP2. 
o deployment of Enhanced Security Network (ESN) solution with a stronger encryption 
algorithm17• 
As described above, one of the major security issues with WEP is the challenge of distributing 
and managing the encryption keys. The 802.lx standard has been introduced to provide a 
centralised authentication and dynamic key distdbution for 802.11 architecture using the 
802.lx standard with RADIUS [7]. 802.lx-a collaborative effort by vendors in the software, 
server, and networking industries-is an authentication standard for 802-based LANs using 
port-based network access control. It is used for communication between wireless clients and 
APs, while RADIUS operates between an AP and an authentication server. Industry leaders 
proposed 802.lx to address WEP vulnerabilities by providing access control and key 
distribution to any (wired or wireless) Ethernet port. The 802.lx standard will be discussed in 
more details in Section 2.5. 
17 For information on WEP2 and ESN, refer to [28, 29]. 
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~ ~ ~~ I fiCUI"'W Issue IVulnerablltf¥ RemarkS 
1. Security features In vendor Securil'{ features, albeit poor in some cases, are no! enabled 
products are frequenily not vvhen shlpped, and users do not enable when installed. Bad 
enabled. security is generally bet\er than no security. 
2. IVs are short (or static), 24·bit Ns cause the generated key stream lo repeat. Repetition 
allows easy decryption of data for a moderately sophist!cated 
adversary. 
3, Cryptographic keys are short. 40·bit keys are inadeqwue for any system. It is generally 
accepted thai key sizes should be greater than 00 bits in lengtn. 
The longer the key, the less likely a comprise is possible from a 
brute-force allack. 
4. Cryptographic keys are shared. Keys l!lal are shared can compromise a system. A fundamental 
tenant of cryptO{lraphy is that the secufity of a system is largely 
dependent on the secrecy' of the keys. 
5. Cryptographic keys cannot be Cryptographic keys should be changed oHen to prevent brule· 
updated automatically and force attacks. 
frequently. 
s. RC4 has a weak key schedule The combination of revealin-g 24 key bits in the tV and a 
and Is inappropriately used In weakness in lhe initial few bytes of the RC4 keyslream leads to 
WEP. an emcienl attack IMI recovers the key. Most other applications 
of RC4 do not expose tr,e weaknesses of RC4 because they do 
not reveal key bits and do not restart the key schedule for every 
packet. This allack is available to moderately sophisticated 
adversaries. 
7. Packet integrity is poor. CRC32 and o!hef linear block codes are inadequate for providing 
cryptograpfiic integrity. Message modification is possible. Linear 
codes are inadequa!e for the protection against advertent attacks 
on data integrity. Cryptographic protection is required to prevenl 
deliberate attacks. Use of noncryptographic protocols often 
facilitates auacks against the cryplograptw 
8. No user authentication occu(s. Only the device is authenticated A device that is stolen can 
access !he network. 
9. Authentication is not enabled; lden!ity.J)ased systems are highly vulnerable particularly in a 
only simple SSID identification wireless system. 
occurs. 
10. Device authentication Is simple OneN.,ay challenge-response aulllenlication is subject to "man.in-
shared-key challenge-response. the-middle'· attacks. Mutual authentication is required to pwvide 
verification that users and u·1e network are legitimate. 
Table 2-2: Key Problems with WEP (the default 802.11 Wireless LAN Security) 
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2.5 IEEE 802.1x Security Protocol 
The security structure in 802.11, including WEP and WEP-based authentication, is not 
designed to scale to handle large, public networks [34]. The shared key design in WEP 
requires the network administrator to trust many users with the same authentication 
credentials for the same set of APs. 
802.1x, a ratified IEEE standard, solves some but not all of these problems. 802.1x is a pmt 
based, extensible authentication protocol. It was designed to prevent an attacker from 
malicious use of the network. 
2.5.1 Terminology 
Figure 2-7 (adapted from [10]) shows the supplicant, authenticator system, and authentication 
server in an 802.1x wireless network. 802.1x requires one authenticator per port. The 
controlled port shown below is not authmised and is therefore not allowing traffic. 
Figure 2-7: The 802.lx Basic Scenario 
Port: A port is a single point of attachment to the LAN infrastructure. In the 802.11 LAN case, 
an AP manages logical ports. Each of these logical ports communicates one-to-one with a 
station's port. 
Authenticator System: The authenticator enforces authentication before allowing access to 
services that are accessible via that port. The authenticator is responsible for communication 
with the supplicant as well as submitting the information received from the supplicant to a 
suitable authentication server. This allows the verification of user credentials to determine the 
consequent port authorisation state. It is important to note that the authenticator's 
functionality is independent of the actual authentication method. It effectively acts as a pass-
through for the authentication exchange. 
Supplicant: The supplicant accesses the services accessible via the authenticator. The 
supplicant is responsible for responding Lo requests from an authenticator for information, 
which establishes its credentials. 
EAP: The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [ 43] is a method of conducting an 
authentication conversation between a user and an authentication server. Intermediate devices 
such as APs and proxy servers do not take pa1t in the conversation. Their role is to relay EAP 
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messages between the parties performing the authentication. 802.1x employs the EAP as an 
authentication framework. 
Extensible Authentication Protocol over LAN (EAPOL): 802.1x defines a standard for 
encapsulating the EAP messages so that they can be handled directly by a LAN MAC service. 
This encapsulated form of EAP frame is known as EAPOL. In addition to canying EAP 
packets, EAPOL also provides control functions such as start, logoff, and key distribution. 
RADIUS: RADIUS is the Remote Access Dial In User Service. It is the standard way of pro-
viding Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting services to a network. Although 
RADIUS protocol support is optional within IEEE 802.1x, it is expected that many 802.1x 
authenticators will function as RADIUS clients. 
2.5.2 802.1x Architecture 
802.1x port-based access control has the effect of creating two distinct points of access to the 
authenticator's attachment to the LAN. One point of access allows the exchange of frames 
between the system and other systems on the LAN. Often, this uncontrolled port allows only 
authentication messages (EAP messages) to be ex-changed. The other (controlled) point of 
access allows the exchange of frames only if the port is authorised. 
When a host connects to the LAN port on an 802.1x switch the authenticity of the host is 
determined by the switch port according to the protocol specified by 802.1x before the 
services offered by the switch are made available on that port. Until the authentication is 
complete, only EAPOL frames are allowed exchanged. Once the host authentication is 
successful, the port switches traffic as a regular port. As previously mentioned, 802.1x was 
developed to address point-to-point networks. In other words, there must be a one-to-one 
relationship between a supplicant and an authenticator. In a wired LAN, a supplicant is 
directly connected to an authenticator. As shown in Figure 2-7, a workstation is directly 
connected to a LAN switch port. Each port on the LAN switch has an associated authenticator. 
The workstation gains access to the network when its supplicant authenticates to the LAN 
port authenticator [10, 33]. 
2.5.3 802.1x in 802.11 Wireless LANs 
Applying the 802.1x structure to the 802.11 network architecture (Figure 2-8, adapted from 
[5]) provides a controlled wireless network with user identification, centralised authentication, 
and dynamic key management. Dynamic key management in an 802.1x framework rectifies 
the drawbacks in the WEP security mechanism by deploying per-user session keys. 
The 802.1x neither excludes nor requires WEP or any other encryption algorithm. It provides 
a mechanism for distributing encryption key information from an AP to a client using the 
EAPOL-Key message. Once the station is associated with an AP, it can exchange EAP 
messages with the authentication server to authorise the port. Before the logical port has been 
authorised, it only exchanges EAP messages. 
One session key can be derived for each user per session. However, if global keys (WEP 
keys) are used, the session key sent from the authentication server to the AP is the only used 
to encrypt the global key; therefore providing per-packet authentication and integrity. An 
EAPOW -key packet is used for the global keys. 
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2.5.4 EAP-TLS 
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Figure 2-& 802.1x over an 802.11 Network 
EAP-TLS [36] is the most commonly implemented EAP type for wireless LANs. It provides 
secure mutual authentication using digital certificates. When a client requests access, the 
response from the authentication server is a server certificate. The client has a certificate, 
signed by a trusted certificate authority, which has been preconfigured by the network 
administrator. The client will reply to the authentication server's challenge with its own 
certificate and validates the server certificate at the same time. Based off the certificate values, 
the EAP-TLS algorithm can derive dynamic WEP keys, and the authentication server will 
send the client the WEP key for use during that session. 
Certificate-based algorithms such as EAP-TLS are highly secure, as it is nearly impossible to 
forge a certificate digitally signed by a certificate authority. On the other hand, the 
management of certificates can be complex and expensive [1]. Thus, depending on the scale 
of an organisation's network, administrative burdens might outweigh the security advantages. 
Figure 2-9 (adapted from [5, 58]) illustrates the process. 
2.6 Wireless Performance 
Security is a property of an entire system and every decision must be examined with security 
in mind [26]. There have been many evaluation studies of IEEE 802.11 wireless network 
performance; however, little attention has been paid to the effects of implementing security on 
performance. Some relevant evaluation studies have been described in this section. Chapter 3 
also introduces some related work in this area in order to justify the design and parameters 
used in this research. 
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Amaro et al. [41] evaluated the performance of wireless networks and concluded that, the 
larger the packet size, the higher the effective rate. The collision a voidance mechanism of 
802.11b protocol confirmed this increase, as traffic overheads introduced by the control 
frames RTS/CTS (see Section 2.2.4) and the ACK frames diminished for larger packets. 
A number of tests, described by [39], conducted on the 802.11 wireless LANs to measure 
performance characteristics (throughput and response time) of the MAC layer under various 
network loads. The results showed that the buffering and fragmentation of data frames can 
seriously influence the performance of an 802.11 wireless LAN. Although the length of a data 
frame and the bit rate of the wireless transceiver also affect the wireless LANs transmission 
capabilities, its performance is generally unaffected by the type of frame addressing and the 
use of reservation frames such as RTS and CTS. 
Chen [11] carried out an experiment to compare the coverage area and performance between 
802.1lb (11 Mbps) and 802.11a (54 Mbps). The study showed that 802.11a provides 2-to-5-
times better data-link rate and throughput performance in the same range (77m) as 802.11b. 
Chen also compared the trade-off between performance and costs in terms of range and total 
system capacity. 802.11a offered better system capacity with fewer cells (APs). 
Empirical results from [55] demonstrated that different modes of 802.11 wireless LAN and 
Ethernet frame size were crucial factors in the determination of a wireless LAN's 
transmission capabilities. The throughput of a wireless LAN increased as the frame length 
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increased and as the amount of broadcast traffic decreased. Furthermore, the authors 
suggested that the mean response times for both wired and wireless LANs were similar, with 
an inter-frame delay of 10 ms or more. 
An empirical characterisation of the instantaneous throughput of a station in an 802.11 b 
Wireless LAN, as a function of the number of competing stations sharing the AP, was 
presented in [ 40]. The results showed that as the number of stations increases, the overall 
throughput decreases and its variance increases. 
Kamerman et al. [ 42] evaluated the throughput of 802.11 wireless LAN s with respect to 
various kinds of overhead. The impact of several sources of overhead was modeled. Sources 
included gap time, preamble, physical layer, MAC layer and TCP/IP header fields, ACK and 
request frames. After measurement of the net throughput and detailed monitoring of actual 
exchange of frames, this modeling was refined. A close fit was found between the results for 
IEEE 802.11b obtained from this model and as measured using currently available 2.4 GHz 
products. 
A recent study [5] evaluated the security performance of an 802.11 wireless network, by 
measuring the throughput and response time of HTTP and FTP traffic types in an unsaturated, 
simple point-to-point architecture. The results showed that the stronger the security 
mechanism implemented, the poorer the network performance. The study recommended using 
multiple clients (in order to expe1iment with congestion in a secure environment), and looking 
at a wide range of traffic types. These recommendations were used as the basis for this 
research. The research also evaluated the performance of wireless LANs at the packet level, 
as described in next chapter. 
23 
Chapter 3 
Experiments 
3.1 Aim 
This aim of this research is to investigate the performance and security issues of 802.11 b 
wireless LANs with multiple clients, hence demonstrating contention in a secure environment. 
The following issues are addressed in particular: 
o How do different security mechanisms affect the performance (delay and throughput) 
of a congested wireless LAN with multiple clients? 
o What are the effects of different packet lengths on the performance of wireless LANs 
using different security mechanisms? 
o What is the impact of security on different traffic types? 
o How does the performance of a secure network vary by adding more clients? 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Design Considerations 
There were a few design decisions made before canying out the experiments. The main three 
were related to security layers, the traffic generator and the performance measurements used 
in the experiments. They are described below: 
Defining Security layers 
As pa1t of the research objectives, we wanted to experiment with the effect of WEP 
authentication and encryption as well as IEEE 802.1 x authentication. The security layers, 
therefore, had to be defined in a way that they would include all the possibilities. 
Traffic Generator 
As mentioned in Section 3.1, this research focuses on the performance evaluation of 
congested wireless LANs. The generator had to be flexible and capable of overloading such 
networks. The specific requirements we had in mind for choosing a traffic generator were: 
o Suitable for wireless networks 
o Capable of overloading an 802.11 LAN 
o Allowing the user to change the size and inter-packet delay 
o Allowing the user to select the generation algorithm 
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Measuring performance 
Many factors affect network performance and some of them interact to provide overall 
performance results. Performance results vary depending on the choice of hardware device, 
software application and network topology [5]. Some of the performance measurements are 
[49, 50]: Response time, Throughput, Coverage area, Mobility, Bandwidth, Latency, Radio 
signal strength, etc. Response time and Throughput were measured in this research to provide 
a comprehensive view of the network performance18• They are defined as follows: 
o Response time: the total time required traffic to travel between two points. It 
includes the time of dial-up connection establishment, security negotiation time 
between the server and the clients and the actual data transfer. 
o Throughput: the total number of bytes transmitted over the network in a given time 
(response time). 
3.2.2 Configuration of Wireless LAN system 
It was decided to use Windows-based operating systems, since Windows XP has a built-in 
implementation of the IEEE 802.1x authentication protocol [51]. As shown in Figure 3-1, the 
experiments were conducted using: 
o One Server 
o Windows 2000 Advanced server 
o 1.4 GHz, 512MB RAM, Orinoco AP-2000 software 
o Three Clients 
o Windows XP Professional 
o 1.4 GHz, 512 MB RAM, Orinoco USB client and ORiNOCO Wireless LAN 
Gold Cards 
o Access Point 
o Lucent Orinoco AP-2000 
Wireless Clients 
192.168.10.80 192.168.10.91 
ll • 
Wired Connection ~ 
----------m 
Access Point 
192.168.10.100 
Figure 3-1: Experimental set up 
~
Server 
192.168.10.1 
18 These two parameters have been measured in other wireless performance studies, such as [39]. 
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Transmission speed was 11 Mbps wireless connections between the AP and the clients and 
100 Mbps Ethernet connections between the AP and the server. Ethereal19 Network Analyser 
was used to capture live network statistics. The measurements were collected from the server. 
Appendix B provides instructions on implementing security mechanisms 20 and further 
enhancing the system architecture used in [5] to support multiple clients. 
3.2.3 Security Layers 
The following eight security layers were chosen to present a hierarchical order of the security 
mechanisms available from both IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.1x standards (For more details 
about each protocol, see Sections 2.4, 2.5): 
1. No security: this is the default security setting provided by vendors. There is no 
security mechanism activated with default configuration. 
2. MAC address authentication: this layer provides MAC address authentication 
carried out at the AP. 
3. WEP authentication: the shared key authentication method specified m the 
802.11 standard is used. 
4. WEP authentication with 40-bit WEP encryption: this layer combines the 
encryption algorithm to provide data privacy. 
5. WEP authentication with 128-bit WEP encryption: the 128-bit shared key used 
is proprietary-based (in the case of Lucent). 
6. EAP-TLS authentication: this is the PKI-based authentication method supported 
by 802.1x, using digital certificates to authenticate the user21 . 
7. EAP-TLS with 40-bit WEP encryption: the combined effect of these tools 
provides the strongest layer of encryption and authentication using per-session 
keys. 
8. EAP-TLS with 128-bit WEP encryption: this layer is the same as above using 
128-bit keys. 
The first five security layers are consistent with the 802.11 standard. Security layers 6 to 8 are 
provided by the 802.1x standard. 
3.2.4 802.1x Model Implementation 
The 802.1x model consisted of the 802.11 access mechanism using open and shared key 
authentication, WEP encryption, and the 802.1x port-based authentication. By combining 
802.1x with 802.11 protocols (as security layers 6 to 8), the model provided a controlled 
wireless network with user identification, centralised authentication, and dynamic key 
management. 
For security layers 6 to 8, a RADIUS server was used to provide dynamic key management 
and centralised authentication (see Figure 3-2, where the server and one of the clients shown). 
19 http://www.ethereal.com/ 
20 In this report security layer and security mechanism represent the same concept. 
21 For further details, refer to section 2.5.4. 
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The authentication method chosen for the experiments was EAP-TLS. The 802.1x model does 
not support end-to-end security, because privacy and confidentiality were only ensured on the 
wireless link by the WEP, but not enforced on the wired counterparts. 
Wireless users were treated as if they existed in one sub-network of an organisation's intranet. 
Specific IP addresses were assigned to the wireless users, AP and different components of the 
server. 
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AccES network 
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Security 
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2-5 
Security 
Level& 
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The RADIUS server and certificate authorities were added to the basic network structure to 
provide the 802.1x authentication support (Figure 3-3). The RADIUS server supported 
wireless user sign-on, and a certificate authority was used to issue certificates to users for 
EAP-TLS authentication22• 
Figure 3-3 802.1x Model Implementation 
2~ This section is a modified version of a section from [5]; the approach taken in implementing 802.1x 
model by this research and [5] are relatively similar. 
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3.2.5 Traffic generator 
We were interested in the ability of a wireless LAN to transfer IP packets in a predefined 
number, size, content and bandwidth in order to measure the variation in performance when 
security mechanisms are implemented. 
Mter spending a considerable amount of time searching for an appropriate traffic generator, 
IP Traffic23 tool was found. It was felt that this generator had met all the requirements we had 
in mind (see Section 3.2.1). IP Traffic is a software-testing tool that is designed for both fixed 
and wireless IP networks and runs on Windows platforms. It can generate, receive, capture 
· and replay IP traffic, and measure end-to-end performance and Quality of Service over any IP 
fixed or mobile network. The generator can manage several simultaneous IP connections (see 
Figure 3-4); however, we only used one active connection from each client to model a more 
realistic situation. We used the real time statistics generated by IP Traffic as well as the data 
collected by Ethereal on the server side to evaluate the performance of the wireless network. 
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Figure 3-4: IP traffic tool on client side 
The following describes and justifies the parameters specified in the generator for the duration 
of the experiments (see Figure 3-5): 
Total number of packets 
Preliminary experiments showed that the choice of packets number did not affect the trends 
observed in the results. Ranges between 10000 and 60000 were tried and 43000 was selected 
as an arbitrary value between the two. 
23 httj>://www.zti-telecom.com/pages/iptraffic-test-measure.htm 
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Figure 3-5: Parameters specified for each connection 
Outgoing bandwidth 
The incoming bandwidth of an 802.11b Access Point is 11 Mbps (according to standards). 
Since we were interested in the behaviour of networks under congestion, we decided to set the 
outgoing bandwidth of each client to be 12 Mbps-well in excess of the published 802.11 
maximum to ensure a congested scenario. 
Traffic type 
It was decided to experiment with TCP and UDP protocols, as these protocols form the basis 
of all the applications running on the IP protocol stack. Other studies have evaluated the 
performance of TCP and UDP protocols over wireless networks (e.g. [40, 44, 52]). However, 
none of them took the impact of different security mechanism into account. 
Content 
Content of each packet was decided to be random. This parameter was not of any importance 
in this research. 
Packet length 
It was decided to set the packet length to be a random integer uniformly distributed over the 
interval [40, 1500] in the first set of experiments. The main advantage of this traffic model is 
that it allows exploring the full range of packet sizes [46]. It was decided to choose 40 and 
1500 bytes as boundaries of IP packet sizes, as these numbers have been used in previous 
woks [44, 45, 48]. In addition, these values were chosen after capturing live traffic on a 
COSC LAN for 3 days24 using Ethereal and considering the packet sizes. Random generation 
24 This was done on July 8-10, 2003. 
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of packet lengths compared with using fixed sizes (in the first set of experiments), provided us 
with more realistic situation. 
In the second part of experiments (studying throughput as a function of packet sizes), four 
fixed packet sizes (i.e. 100, 500, 1000, 1500) were selected and the experiments were 
conducted using each value at a time. These values have been used in other performance 
studies such as [ 44, 52]. 
3.3 Procedure 
As described in Section 3.1, this research aims to evaluate the effect of different security 
mechanisms and packet sizes on the performance of a congested wireless LAN with multiple 
clients. 
In the first set of experiments, the throughput and response times of two traffic types (TCP 
and UDP) were measured under different security mechanisms. The experiments were then 
repeated for two and three clients to study the impact of adding more clients. Two different 
bandwidths were defined: 12000 kb/s (to represent a congested network) and 500 kb/s (to 
represent an unsaturated network). It was decided to set the packet length to be a random 
integer uniformly distributed over the interval [40, 1500], as stated in the previous section. 
The security layers, traffic generator and the system configuration used during the 
experiments are detailed in Section 3.2. Figure 3-6 illustrates the configuration of traffic 
generator on the server side, where the clients' IP addresses were manually allocated. 
Appendix B provides instructions on setting up the system. 
In the second set of experiments, the throughput was studied as a function of different packet 
sizes, under different security mechanisms. The packet sizes were divided into four fixed 
numbers, i.e. 100, 500, 1000, 1500, as described before. The experiments were conducted 
using one client and three different security mechanisms25 , and throughput was measured for 
both TCP and UDP traffic types. Results are discussed in Section 3.4. 
Each experiment was repeated eight times. Due to system factor influences (memory caching 
and disk pages), it was decided to discard the first three results, to exclude system factors . 
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Figure 3-6: Corifiguration set up on server side 
25 Chosen from the eight mechanisms, listed in Section 3.2.3. 
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3.4 Results 
The experiments followed the eight security layers described in section 3.2.3. An 
infrastructure mode of operation and a single cell were used with three clients. Performance 
measures were gathered by running five repetitive tests at each security configuration. 
Experiments evaluating the performance of TCP were separated from UDP's and each set was 
conducted for different number of clients. Results were collected through log files generated 
by the traffic generator and the Ethereal monitoring tool. Data were analysed, at the 
corresponding 95% confidence interval. 
3.4.1 Effect of security mechanisms on performance 
In the first part of the experiments, the bandwidth was set to 500 Kb/s to represent a lightly 
loaded network (in other words, normal situation when the network is not congested). Figure 
3-7 illustrates the throughput of TCP and UDP traffic types under different security layers, 
discussed in Section 3.2.3. These results confirmed the general trends reported in [5], 
meaning that the stronger the security mechanism implemented, the poorer the network 
performance. 
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Figure 3-8 and 3-9, on the other hand, illustrate the throughput and (per-packet) response 
times ofTCP and UDP traffic types when the network is congested (bandwidth is set to 12 
Mb/s). 
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Figure 3-8: Throughput ofTCP, VDP traffic in a congested network 
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As the graphs show, the performance of a congested network at security layers 4, 5, 7 and 8 
(WEP encryption is in place) is significantly less than the performance of the network at 
security layers 1, 2, 3 and 6. The security layers 4, 5, 7 and 8 decrease the TCP throughput by 
86.1% and the UDP throughput by 54.3% (on average). In addition, they increase the TCP 
response time by 86.2% and UDP response time by 51.9%. The results show that in congested 
networks, the overhead produced by encrypting each individual packet (implemented at 
security layers 4, 5, 7 and 8), is significantly higher than applying more advanced 
authentication methods, such as EAP-TLS protocol implemented at security layer 626• 
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Figure 3-9: Per-packet response times ofTCP,. UDP traffic in a congested 
network 
The performance of TCP and UDP can also be compared. Since the TCP protocol uses a 
congestion control mechanism, it is significantly slower than the UDP protocol in congested 
networks, especially when WEP encryption is applied. The TCP throughput is 21.6% of UDP 
throughput at security layers 4, 5, 7 and 8 and 85.5 %of UDP throughput at security layers 1, 
2, 3 and 6. 
Table 3-1 and 3-2 show the mean and standard deviation of TCP and UDP throughput and 
response times when the wireless LAN is congested. 
Security TGP UDP 
la\fe_r -~~~~ 
1 447.5200 7.3095 535.6960 0.2218 
2 470.7520 4.3070 535.0120 1.0143 
3 464.4460 11.5685 536.5260 4.0540 
4 67.2940 1.7635 245.4660 0.3958 
5 63.7380 1.8943 245.6100 2.0043 
6 454.6480 0.4346 539.4560 5.4398 
7 64.3000 2.1949 244.3340 0.7835 
8 61.5300 1.9546 245.8260 3.2859 
Table 3-1: The Mean and SD ofTCP and UDP throughput under different security 
mechanisms 
The security layers significantly differ from each other in their effects on the throughput of 
the network for TCP (F (7, 28) = 8558.155, p < .001) and UDP (F (7, 28) = 14155.207, p < .001) 
26 This is not the case in unsaturated networks (shown in Figure 3-7), as the network performance at 
layer 6 (EAP-TLS authentication) is lower than layer 5 (WEP encryption with 128-bit keys). 
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traffic types. The security layers also significantly differ from each other in their effects on 
the response time of the network, for both TCP (F (7, 28) = 2439.143, p < 0.001) and UDP (F (7, 
28) = 9103.760, p < 0.001) traffic. The data that are used for ANOVA analysis, are based on 
Appendix A Captured Data27• 
Table 3-2: The Mean and SD ofTCP and UDP response times under different security 
mechanisms 
3.4.2 Effect of adding more clients 
To evaluate the performance of the network in a secure multi-client environment, the 
experiments were repeated using two and three clients. Table 3-3 shows the average per-
station throughput for UDP traffic. Over all security layers, the average throughput of each 
station decreased by 49.5% when the experiments were conducted using two clients and 
66.5% when using three clients.Z8 
Table 3-3: Average per-station throughput for UDP traffic 
When WEP encryption was not enabled (under security layers 1, 2, 3 and 6), UDP packet loss 
rates were 3.2%, and 0.6 % for TCP packet. The UDP drop rate increased by 3.6% when 
WEP encryption was enabled (security layers 4, 5, 7 and 8), while only increasing 0.2% for 
TCP traffic. On average, the observed results were increased by 0.4% when the number of 
clients was increased to three. 
Our experiments validate the results reported in [ 40], which presented an empirical 
characterisation of the instantaneous throughput of a station in an 802.11 b Wireless LAN, as a 
function of the number of competing stations sharing the AP. The results showed that as the 
number of stations increases, the overall throughput decreases and its variance increases. 
27 Appendix A provides the data collected for one client. 
28 Same results were observed for TCP traffic type. 
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However, that study did not take into account the effect of having different security 
h . 29. 1 mec amsms m p ace. 
3.4.3 Effect of various packet sizes on performance 
As described in Section 3.3, four fixed packet sizes, i.e. 100, 500, 1000, 1500 bytes were 
chosen in order to evaluate their impacts on the throughput of a congested wireless LAN 
under different security mechanisms. 
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Figure 3-10: TCP throughput for different packet sizes 
As Figure 3-10 shows, the throughput of TCP traffic is maximum when the packet size is set 
to 1000 bytes and this is the case for the three security layers chosen (MAC authentication, 
WEP Encryption with 128-bit keys, and WEP Encryption combined with 802.1x 
authentication). 
Figure 3-11 shows similar results for UDP throughput. The throughput has the highest value 
when the packet size is set to 1000 bytes, at first and third security layer. When the 2"d 
security layer is implemented (WEP encryption) packet size of 500 and 1000 bytes have 
almost the same throughput, with 0.1 KB/s difference (as shown in Table 3-5). 
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Figure 3-11: VDP throughput for different packet sizes 
29 As detailed in section 3.2.3 
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Packet MAC WEP WEP Encryption + 
Size (BYJe) Authentication Encryption 802.1x Authentication 
100 150.81 147.69 130.18 
500 443.29 439.7 327.26 
1000 648.82 439.8 434.67 
1500 538.01 375.59 347.54 
Table 3-5: UDP throughput for different packet sizes 
3.5 Discussion 
Network performance was observed to significantly decrease in a congested situation when 
WEP encryption was applied. With WEP encryption in place, the TCP throughput decreased 
by 86.1% and the UDP throughput by 54.3% (on average). Three factors contribute to such a 
change in peliormance, with the third being the most influential: 
o WEP Encryption: WEP uses an RC4 stream cipher in order to provide confidentially 
and integritl0• When WEP is in use, the fame body expands by eight bytes. Four 
bytes are used for a frame body IV header, and four are used for the ICV trailer [14]. 
These additional eight bytes do not affect the performance in an unsaturated network, 
as reported by [ 5] and confirmed in section 3 .4.1 of this report. However, when the 
network is congested, there is not enough bandwidth available. The packets will be 
dropped at the AP, due to their additional length. The performance might, therefore, 
be decreased 
o WEP resynchronisation: The loss of a single bit of a data stream encrypted under 
RC4 causes the loss of all the data following the lost bit. This is because data loss 
desynchronises the RC4 encryption and decryption engines [21]. The 
resynchronisation problem gets only worse as more bits become lost. Since 802.11 
often drops entire packets, they will have to be resent by the client sides, which will 
result in performance degradation of congested networks. 31 The WEP architecture 
accommodates itself to loss by reinitialising the cipher key schedule on every data 
frame. 
o Hardware and software implementation: WEP encrypts frames as they traverse the 
wireless medium [14]. In other words, the encryption is done between the client 
machines and the AP. The wireless cards used in the experiments [53], 
encrypt/decrypt the packets at the firmware and the AP [54], encrypt/decrypts them at 
the hardware. When there is not enough bandwidth in the network, the buffer at the 
AP fills up and it keeps dropping the packets, because the CPU at the AP is too 
congested to process any additional data. 
According to these results, in congested wireless networks, the overhead produced by 
encrypting each individual packet is significantly more than applying advanced authentication 
mechanism such as EAP-TLS standard (defined in 802.lx protocol and used at security layer 
6 of these experiments). 
The performance of TCP and UDP traffic types can also be compared. When changing from 
TCP (connection-oriented environment) to UDP (connection-less environment), the packet 
30 Refer to [31 (Section 3.3.1), [14] and [24] for information about WEP encryption standard. 
31 This indicates the infeasibility of using RC4 over 802.11 networks [14]. 
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drop rate increased by 81.3% on average. Under both traffic types, the network performance 
degraded as WEP encryption was applied (at security layers 4, 5, 7, 8, described in Section 
3.2.3). Yet, the performance of TCP was significantly lower than UDP (the TCP throughput 
was 21.6 % of that of UDP). This poor pe1formance can be justified by the fact that TCP 
protocol applies congestion control mechanism, when the network is congested and the 
protocol detects packet drop. Figure 3-8 and 3-9 illustrate the performance of both traffic 
types. 
As the number of clients increased, the overall throughput decreased, due to the effect of 
collisions and backoffs. The average throughput of the network decreased by 49.5% when the 
experiments were conducted using two clients and 66.5% when using three clients. Similar 
patterns were observed for both TCP and UDP traffic types, under all security layers. 
Four different packet sizes (100, 500, 1000, and 1500) bytes were chosen in order to evaluate 
their impacts on the throughput of the congested wireless LAN under three different security 
mechanisms (MAC authentication, WEP encryption, and WEP encryption combined with 
802.1 x authentication). The packet size of 1000 bytes resulted in best throughput for both 
TCP and UDP traffic types under three security layers (see Section 3.4.3). The results 
confirmed those published in [41]. Due to the collision avoidance mechanism of the 802.11b 
protocol, the traffic overheads introduced by the control frames RTS/CTS (see Section 2.2.4) 
and the ACK frames diminishes, as the packet gets larger. The packets were fragmented 
before they reach the MTU of 1500 bytes, so the performance of the network decreased, when 
fragmentation occmTed. 
3.5.1 Limitations 
In general, there are several limitations associated with the experiments. Experiments were 
conducted in a confined environment, which may not simulate the real world. Real world 
factors such as environmental effects are important in wireless networks, since radio 
frequency transmission is influenced by other technologies operating in the same frequency 
band such as microwaves and weather conditions (see Section 2.3). These interferences may 
affect the performance results of a wireless network. Additionally, the experimental setup was 
confined to a single room. Factors such as wall interference degrade pelformance in actual 
wireless networks installed in a building. It was decided to run the experiments in the same 
room to eliminate as many environmental effects as possible. 
One inherent limitation is using equipment containing vendor-specific implementations of 
packet handling, encryption algorithms and feature sets. Different vendors provide different 
capabilities, and as prior literature has shown [40], different hardware implementation can 
affect the performance. 
The results determined from the effect of adding more clients on performance (Section 3.4.2) 
cannot be generalised to more than three clients, due to equipment limitation. However, the 
aim of this research was to evaluate the effect of security on the pelformance of congested 
networks. Experimenting with three clients was enough to create congestion, in order for the 
impact of security to be studied. 
This research examined one type of 802.11 wireless networks, the infrastructure mode; the 
results might not be applicable to ad hoc wireless networks. Furthermore, the research 
focused on 802.11 b (as it is the most popular standard for Wireless LAN networking), and did 
not evaluate the security performance of other 802.11 standards such as 802.11a or 802.11g 
(see Section 2.2.1). 
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Chapter 4 
Future Work 
The experiments used EAP-TLS authentication, which uses digital certificates in order to 
authenticate the users. Protected EAP (PEAP) [38], proposed by RSA, Cisco and Microsoft, is 
another 802.1x mechanism. It provides mutual authentication and key generation, protects 
user authentication and supports quick re-authentication. Further research could be canied out 
to investigate the effect of PEAP on performance of congested and un-congested networks. 
Another research area that can be undertaken is to evaluate the effect of WPA (Wi-Fi 
Protected Access), which is an extension to 802.11 ESN (see Section 2.4.3), as well as 
software versus hardware implementations of encryption, on performance of wireless 
networks. 
Roaming supports client stations moving freely from one cell (the AP coverage area) to 
another and requires the interaction between APs and Distribution Systems (see Figure 2-4). 
Users can move between the cells. When it occurs, transfening of credentials is necessary to 
ensure a secure connection. This scenario can involve reinitiating a search for an AP in the 
same way the client would, when it is initialised, or using other methods, such as referencing 
a table built during the previous association [47]. This research was limited to a single AP. 
Future research is recommended with multiple APs carrying out the experiments similar to 
the ones presented in this report, considering roaming factors. As mobility increases from 
wireless LANs to wireless WANs (seamless handoffs between the two), further research 
could be done to examine the ability of maintaining a secure connection without re-
association and re-authentication. 
As outlined in the Section 3.5.1, this research examined one type of wireless network, the 
802.11 standard; the results might not be applicable to all types of wireless networks. It also 
concentrated on the infrastructure mode of the 802.11 standards. This might prevent 
generalisation of the performance or security results to the ad-hoc mode of 802.11 wireless 
networks (see Section 2.2.3). Furthermore, the research focused on 802.11b (Wi-Fi) protocol, 
as it is the most popular standard for wireless LAN networking. Evaluating the security 
performance of other 802.11 standards such as upcoming 802.11g, would be a foreseeable 
extension to this work. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
This research was successful in investigating the performance and security issues of IEEE 
802.11 wireless LAN s with the layered security model, using multiple clients. It studied the 
interaction between different security layers and their effects on performance (response time 
and throughput) of congested and un-congested networks. 
The ANOV A analysis confirmed that the security layers significantly differ from each other 
in their effects on the throughput of the network. When the network was not saturated (un-
congested), the performance degraded as the quality of the security protection increased. In 
this situation, cetiificate-based authentication (EAP-TLS) increased response times and 
decreased throughput more than WEP encryption. However, when the network was congested, 
the petformance was significantly low when WEP encryption was in place. In other words, 
WEP encryption affected the performance significantly more than certificate-based 
authentication. As the number of clients increased, the overall throughput decreased, due to 
the effect of collisions and backoffs. 
The performance operating with TCP was significantly less than with UDP traffic, due to the 
congestion control mechanism, implemented by the TCP protocol. On the other hand, since 
UDP is a connectionless protocol, the rate of packet drop was more than with TCP traffic. 
Under both traffic types, the network performance degraded as WEP encryption was applied. 
The research also evaluated the effect of different TCP and UDP packet sizes on network 
performance, when utilising different security mechanisms. It was concluded that the larger 
the packet size, the better the performance. Similar patterns were observed for MAC 
authentication, WEP encryption, and WEP encryption combined with 802.1x authentication. 
Future work includes investigating the secmity performance of emerging IEEE 802.11 
standards such as 802.11g protocol using software and hardware implementations of 
encryption. Extending the security architectures to multiple APs and across wireless LAN/3G 
interfaces is also recommended. 
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Appendix A 
Captured Data 
TCP UDP 
Security 
Layer 
TCP Response Time TCP Throughput UDP Throughput UDP Response Time (Kbytes/sec) (sec) (Kbvtes/sec) (sec) 
1 440.35 78.28 535.52 64.44 
1 457.14 76.09 535.77 64.42 
1 448.87 77.42 535.85 64.41 
1 440.11 77.31 535.41 64.66 
1 451.13 77.02 535.93 64.48 
2 471.23 73.76 536.64 64.32 
2 476.35 72.94 534.24 64.60 
2 464.47 74.82 534.21 64.60 
2 472.11 73.33 535.32 64.81 
2 469.6 72.98 534.65 64.27 
3 482.69 72.0 541.24 63.76 
3 461.92 75.23 537.51 64.21 
3 450.72 77.09 530.42 65.30 
3 461.76 75.82 535.12 64.80 
3 465.14 76.3 538.34 65.14 
4 66.57 524.63 245.77 134.05 
4 70.29 496.64 245.09 134.25 
4 65.88 530.07 245.99 133.94 
4 67.4 522.07 245.15 133.98 
4 66.33 530.44 245.33 134.15 
5 66.40 525.41 243.12 135.56 
5 61.15 571 248.2 133.13 
5 64.15 544.2 244.53 134.69 
5 63.12 563.2 245.23 133.87 
5 63.87 529.77 246.97 134.64 
6 454.8 76.41 533.25 64.71 
6 453.99 76.54 543.23 63.53 
6 454.44 76.48 543.92 63.45 
6 454.98 76.45 543.11 63.48 
6 455.03 76.54 533.77 63.97 
7 67.45 517.82 244.25 134.97 
7 64.51 540.7 245.35 134.37 
7 61.45 568.39 243.76 1 
7 63.32 560.17 244.87 134.45 
7 64.77 562.12 243.44 134.49 
8 64.79 559.54 251.16 128.82 
8 60.90 573.73 242.76 131.05 
8 59.86 583.25 244.59 134.50 
8 61.76 570.15 246.59 132.50 
8 60.34 581.46 244.03 131.70 
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.Appendix B 
Configuration Procedure 
The following describes the modification made to the wireless LAN architecture used in [5] in 
order to enhance it to support multiple clients. Section 1 presents the enhancements made to 
the clients side and Section 2 illustrates the modifications made to the server side. 
B.l The Clients side 
After installing ORiNOCO Wireless LAN Gold Cards32 on Windows XP client machines, the 
client machines were assigned suitable IP addresses and subnet masks. The IP address of 
gateway and DNS server on each machine was also specified (See Figure B-1 ). 
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Figure B-1: Specifying the JP addresses 
The domain and computer name for each client was specified, as shown in Figure B-2. 
32 Donated by Lucent (www.lucent.com) 
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Figure B-2: Configuration of computer and domain name 
Figure B-3 illustrates the specification of WEP authentication and encryption, using 45-bit 
key length. WEP encryption was implemented at security layers 4, 5, 7 and 8. 
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Figure B-3: Configuration ofWEP encryption 
The IEEE 802.1x authentication protocol (EAP-TLS) was implemented at security layers 6, 7 
and 8. Figure B-4 illustrates the process of specifying the properties for each digital certificate. 
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The certificates were issued by CALAB, the Certification Authority, which was set up on 
server machine (See Figure B-12). The certificates were used for authenticating the users. 
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Figure B-4: Specifying the certificate properties 
IP Traffic , the traffic generator used m this research, has two operating modes. Figure B-5 
shows the client mode. 
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Figure B-5: IP Traffic on Clients side 
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As described in Section 3.2.5 of the report, one active connection was used from each client 
machine to send and receive traffic. The IP address of the server and type of traffic was also 
specified. 
B.2 The Server Side 
Access Point configuration 
Figure B-6 illustrates the MAC authentication tab on the AP. The IP addresses of new client 
machines were added to MAC Access Control Table. The MAC authentication security was 
in place from security layer 2 onwards. 
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Figure B-6: Implementing the MAC authentication 
Figure B-7 shows the specification of RADIUS authentication on the AP. RADIUS 
authentication was activated on AP at security layers 6, 7 and 8. 
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Figure B-7: Activating the Radius Server on the AP 
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The IEEE 802.1x security was used in security layers 6, 7 and 8. Figure B-8 illustrates the 
encryption key parameters specified on the AP. These parameters were the same as the ones 
specified on the clients side (See Figure B-3). 
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Figure B-8: 802.1x security model on the AP 
y 
The new client machines and new users were added to the Active Directory (AD), as shown 
in Figure B-9 and B-10. 
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Figure B-9: Adding new machines to AD 
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Figure B-1 0: Adding new users to AD 
In the PKI configuration, the option for issuing automatic machine/computer certificates was 
enabled, as shown in Figure B-11. 
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Figure B-11: Automatic issuing of computer certificate 
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CALAB, the Microsoft certification authority, was used on the server side to issue certificate 
to the-users. Figure B-12 illustrates the parameters specified during the process of issuing 
certificates. The certificates were stored on the server and were transferred to the client 
machines. In doing that, it was important to mark the keys as exportable33 • 
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Figure B-12: Issuing certificates to network users 
Figure B-13 illustrates the process of specifying the security mechanism on the server side 
(Remote Access Policy). 
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Figure B-13: Configuring the security mechanisms on server 
33 In order to access the certification authority on the server, the \\servernarne\certsrv address was used. 
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Ethereal 
As described in section 3.2.2 of the report, Ethereal was used to capture the traffic generated 
by IP Traffic tool between the server and the clients. 
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Figure B-14: Ethereal capturing TCP packets on server side 
Figure B-14 illustrates the process of capturing TCP packets. The packets were then filtered 
and protocol statistics were used in order to calculate the throughout and response times of the 
network. 
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